Hope for Kyoto in the "Prisoner's Dilemma"

As we approach the next round of Kyoto talks in Bali in December, it is heartening to think that insights from "prisoner's dilemma" game theory could offer hope for substantive, cooperative progress on climate change.

As reported in "Playing Games With the Planet," (September 27, 2007, The Economist print edition), Michael Liebreich of New Energy Finance, a research firm serving hedge funds and other institutions, has adapted Robert Axelrod's "prisoner's dilemma" theory to the seeming dilemma that no one country has an incentive to tackle climate change on its own.

(The article provides a quick refresher on the "prisoner's dilemma," which I will not repeat here, perhaps mercifully for those still trying to forget that graduate-level introductory economics course experience.)

According to the theory, on the first "play" all countries will neglect the problem of climate change "on the grounds that others will solve it." Yet the theory also says that when the players know there will be multiple plays, the players will begin to cooperate.

Liebreich's white paper, "How to Save the Planet: Be Nice, Retaliatory, Forgiving & Clear" provides myriad suggestions for how to accelerate the "plays" and the intended outcome of cooperation.

Carla E. Dearing